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1 Introduction
Economic reforms are likely to create losers and too often the difficulties involved in iden-
tifying and compensating adversely affected individuals have made major policy changes
impossible. For this reason, the dual–track approach implemented in the Chinese economic
reforms should be of great interests to policy makers. As Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000)
have shown, this mechanism has the potential not only to generate an efficient allocation
of resources, but more importantly to do so without creating losers. Some observers have
concluded that the “dual–track approach is perhaps the most important aspect of Chinese
reforms since it was, at the time, an innovative solution to the political constraints on the
direction and speed of reform”(International Finance Corporation (2000)).
Indeed, dual track–like reforms have been attempted in other economic environments.
Stiglitz (1998) discusses how the Clinton administration tried to implement dual track like
reforms, as in the case of the liberalization of hydroelectric power prices that was proposed
in the National Action Plan. The Bush administration’s proposed overhaul of the US social
security system also contained features of a dual–track mechanism, in which current retirees
are promised unchanged benefits, while younger workers would be allowed to invest in per-
sonal accounts. Finally, another interesting example is the recent reform of the Italian labor
market, where older workers are kept under existing tenure contracts, while new personnel
can be hired according to temporary, short term arrangements.1
There is, however, a critical institutional difference between centrally planned economies
and market economies. While in the former government control completely dictates almost
all economic decisions, in the latter government control is at most incomplete. That is,
despite government interventions, economic decisions by private agents continue to play a
role in determining the resource allocation. This paper asks whether the welfare implications
of the dual–track mechanism are the same in these different environments.2
1Italy also carried out an important reform of its public retirement system that is characterized by a
dual–track approach. Before 1996 workers could retire on the basis of a defined benefit system, guaranteeing
up to 80% of the last salary, given an average contribution of 24.7%. The reform introduced in 1996 has
obliged people who have worked for less than 18 years to retire according to a new, defined contribution
system that for an average contribution of about 32.7%, is expected to return 50-60% of the last salary when
the individual retires. People who have worked more than 18 years are instead allowed to stay under the old
system. This has led observers to estimate that by 1999 over 40% of currently employed workers would still
retire using the old, more generous system. See Boeri (2003) for more detailed discussion.
2Our paper does not explicitly model other possible institutional differences. For instance, as Murphy,
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The dual–track reform strategy can improve efficiency without creating losers because it
preserves all the existing rents throughout the reform process. However, in economies where
government control is incomplete, the anticipation of a policy change may well induce rational
agents to alter their pre-reform behaviors in order to maximize the same rents that the dual–
track mechanism tries to maintain3 and this can either alleviate or exacerbate the pre–reform
distortions. Given that the dual track reform represents a Pareto improvement only upon
the pre reform allocation, the dynamic welfare effects of anticipated dual track liberalization
as compared to having no reform at all are in general ambiguous. This ambiguity will instead
not arise in centrally planned economies because of complete government control. For this
reason, to fully understand the impact of a dual–track mechanism in the context of a market
economy, we need to consider not only how the reform affects the resource allocation after it
has taken place, but also how the expectation of a future reform affects the allocation before
its introduction.
To this end we extend the analysis by Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) in two ways. First,
while Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) have implicitly assumed that in the status quo gov-
ernment fiat completely dictates both quantities produced and consumed as well as prices,
we allow the status quo intervention to be incomplete, in the sense that in the first period
at least some transactions are not dictated by the government.4 Second, we move beyond
their static framework by introducing a simple dynamic model involving two periods, where
a dual–track reform taking place in the second period is anticipated in the first.
The basic question we address in this paper is whether, taking into account that the
reform will have effects on the allocations in both periods, the dual–track liberalization can
continue to be Pareto improving as compared to the status quo. By establishing a necessary
and sufficient condition for this result to hold, we show that the change in behavior in the
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) have pointed out, a strong government must be in place to enforce a dual–track
reform, as it was the case in China.
3Given that the purpose of a dual–track mechanism is to ‘build consensus’ for a policy change, dual
track–like reforms carried out in countries with a democratic tradition have been the subject of vibrant
discussions. The recent debate on the reform of the social security system in the US is one obvious example.
Even in China, the question of whether the price reform should proceed in a dual track fashion has been the
subject of a lively debate both in the policy circle and among the general public. (See for instance ‘Peking
polls the masses on prices’ in the Financial Times, August 22 1985.)
4Our analysis differs from Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). They show that in a static setting a dual
track reform may lead to an efficiency loss when the separation of the two tracks is not well enforced. We
take instead a dynamic perspective and the potential source of additional distortions is the intertemporal
arbitrage activities of the agents.
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first period must not lead to any surplus redistribution among inframarginal agents and
must induce the marginal agents to continue to trade. These two conditions in turn imply
that the status quo government policy must involve price fixing for some agents and the
government dictating transactions for the rest of the them. If this condition is not met, a
policy maker will either have to manipulate the public’s expectations, so that the dual track
reform will come as a ‘surprise’, or he will need to make a credible commitment not to use a
dual track reform. Our analysis therefore highlights some important caveats to the broader
applicability of the mechanism analyzed by Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the model,
while section 3 analyzes the second–period allocation and reproduces the central result of
Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000). We study how the first period allocation responds to the
anticipated reform in section 4. In section 5, we evaluate, from a dynamic perspective, the
welfare effect of the anticipated dual–track liberalization. The analysis is carried out in two
steps. Section 5.1 considers a status quo scenario in which the government does not dictate
any transaction, while Section 5.2 investigates the case in which the government initially
dictates at least some of them. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
To introduce our discussion in the simplest possible framework, we follow Lau, Qian, and
Roland (2000) and use a partial equilibrium setup, in which a continuum of buyers and
producers each demand and supply one and only one unit of a commodity.5 All agents are
price-takers. Differently from Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000), our model has two–periods. In
the first, the market is distorted by a government policy. In the second, the government im-
plements a reform aimed at removing this distortion. Buyers’ preferences are time separable
and invariant, and producers’ costs remain constant over time. Both sets of agents have a
discount factor δ, and the commodity is assumed to be perishable.6
In the first period, the government intervention can take two forms, each one of which
5For a general equilibrium analysis of the dual–track mechanism, see Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997).
6Thus, no agent can arbitrage through storage. Of course, if the commodity was assumed to be storable,
physical arbitrage could take place as a reaction to an expected reform. As it is shown in the appendix
though, contractual arbitrage brought about by the dual–track reform mechanism and physical arbitrage by
storage work in fundamentally different ways.
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is applied to one of two complementary segments of the population. For the first segment,
the government dictates all agents’ transactions. That is, the government decides for each
producer whether it will produce or not, and for each buyer whether it will buy or not from
a producer within this segment. The price at which these transactions take place is also
determined by the government, and no resale is allowed. The government policy in this
segment of the economy resembles the ones implemented in a centrally planned economy.
For the second segment, each agent is free to decide whether to participate or not in a
transaction, but the government might fix the price at which the transaction takes place.7
We say that agents belonging to the first segment are subject to a complete intervention,
while agents belonging to the second face an incomplete intervention. When the first segment
does not include any agent, we are in a market economy. When the second segment is empty,
we are in a centrally planned economy, while if both segments are present, we are in a mixed
economy.
Following Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000), we assume that the government has no informa-
tion regarding agents’ characteristics (i.e., cost to produce and willingness to pay). Therefore,
in the case of complete intervention, the government may force a producer to transact with
a buyer whose willingness to pay does not even cover the former’s cost of production. In the
case of incomplete intervention, the price-setting leads to the need of rationing. Given the
lack of information on the part of the government, efficient rationing may not be feasible.
Accordingly, we assume random rationing in the sense that agents who are willing to enter
a trade will be randomly assigned the opportunity to carry out the exchange.
The second–period reform removes both (complete and incomplete) forms of govern-
ment intervention. The reform is introduced in a dual track fashion to minimize potential
opposition and to overcome the lack of information concerning individual buyer/seller’s char-
acteristics (i.e., their preferences and costs to produce). As a result, a “liberalized” and a
“regulated” track emerge in the second period. In the former, agents are free to enter new
exchanges. In the latter, independently on whether they were subject to a complete or
incomplete intervention in the first period, private agents are instead assigned rights and
obligations derived from the first period transactions carried out under the original gov-
ernment policy. That is, if private agents exchanged a given quantity at a certain price in
7In this paper we treat a quota as a form of complete intervention, as its presence results in some agents
being excluded from the market.
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the first period, the very same transaction will be enforced in the second period.8 As an
example, think about the case of a labor market in which, in the first period labor contracts
between workers and employers are governed by a union agreement specifying the wage rate.
In the second period, the government introduces a reform, which allows newly hired workers
to be paid a (lower) market wage rate, but at the same time requires employers to continue
to pay the same union-set wage rate to those workers they have previously employed. In
other words, a dual track approach requires contracts governing first period transactions to
continue to be enforced in the second period.9 At the same time, the reform calls for the es-
tablishment of a liberalized track, where parties can carry out transactions at the prevailing
equilibrium market price.
Key to our analysis is that private agents anticipate in the first period the implementation
of the dual track reform in the second. As a result, the equilibrium resource allocation in
the first period is determined not only by the original distortionary policy, but also by the
anticipated second period reform. Therefore, when evaluating dual track liberalization, we
need to consider its welfare implications over both periods. Specifically, we will compare
the equilibrium allocation under dual track liberalization to the status quo (i.e., the no
liberalization outcome). We say that dual track liberalization achieves a Pareto improvement
over the status quo if the total (discounted) surplus of each private agent over the two periods
is greater under dual track than under the status quo.
3 The Second Period Resource Allocation
Our analysis of the second period equilibrium reproduces that of Lau, Qian, and Roland
(2000). To proceed, it is useful to distinguish between two sets of agents: those who have
transacted in the first period and those who have not. Previously active agents must carry
8In a centrally planned economy, this result can be achieved by continuing to enforce plan transactions
in the post–reform equilibrium. In an economy where the original government intervention did not involve
exclusively complete control, agents need to be able to establish the validity of their pre–reform trades in
a court, which can enforce these transactions. In the examples we have discussed in the introduction, the
initial transactions were clearly not anonymous and could easily be documented, as for example in Stiglitz’s
example of liberalization of hydroelectric power prices. More generally, even the repetition of a simple
purchase at a department store could be easily enforced, as long as the interested party retains a transaction
record like for example the corresponding credit card slip. A similar point has been made by Mandler (2005).
9In addition, if the original government policy involved a transfer (i.e. a tax or a subsidy) to an agent in
the first period, the same payment will be made in the second.
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out their original transactions as required by the dual track liberalization mechanism. By
doing so, the dual track mechanism ensures that in the second period no one can be worse off
as compared to the status quo. As in Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000), we further assume that
the dual track mechanism allows agents to carry out these transactions by taking advantage
of the existence of a liberalized track, without actually producing or using the commodity.
For instance, an employer can second his former employee (whom he is obliged to hire at
the union wage rate) to another employer at the market wage rate, instead of actually using
him. By granting previously active agents access to the liberalized track, the dual track
mechanism enables them to arbitrage between the market price and the marginal cost (or
marginal willingness to pay) of the good/service they are obliged to provide (or entitled to
consume). For instance, by seconding his employee at the market wage rate, an employer
avoids using the employee whenever his marginal benefit from doing so is lower than the
market wage rate. As a consequence, the overall quantity actually consumed in the two
tracks is the result of the behavior of those buyers with a marginal willingness to pay larger
than P e. Similarly, for a given P e, the total quantity actually produced in the two tracks
will be generated only by those producers with a marginal cost lower than P e. This implies
that in equilibrium the free-market price must be at the level where the marginal cost equals
the marginal willingness to pay, independently of the original government policy.
We summarize our observations in the following Lemma, which reproduces Proposition
1 in Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000):
Lemma 1 Regardless of the first period government policy, dual track liberalization attains
the first best allocation in the second period. Moreover, the equilibrium price in the liberalized
track is the same as the competitive equilibrium price. Furthermore, no agent is worse off
compared to the first period.
4 Expectations and Intertemporal Arbitrage
In a dynamic context, the first period allocation depends on the agents’ expectations about
the second period reform. Translating the static discussion of Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000)
to our dynamic framework,10 we allow the reform to be anticipated. In this case, agents
10Alternatively, we can think of their analysis as assuming that the liberalization comes as a “surprise”,
so that the first period outcome is not affected by the ensuing liberalization.
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Figure 1: First period strategic demand and supply
who are subject to the incomplete intervention are induced to strategically modify their
behavior in the first period in order to take advantage of new arbitrage opportunities; whereas
those who are subject to the complete intervention cannot modify their behavior. The
opportunities arise because dual track liberalization creates two tracks in the second period,
and agents who have engaged in transactions in the first period are entitled to exchange in
the regulated track in the second period. Since the prices prevailing in the two tracks may
very well differ, agents will attempt to take advantage of such differences by modifying their
first period behavior. We refer to these activities as contractual arbitrage. For instance,
if workers realize that they can lock up the union-set wage rate in the second period by
entering a labor contract in the first period, they will be more willing to supply their labor
services if the union-set wage rate is substantially higher than the market rate in the second
period. The opposite is true for employers.
Figure 1 illustrates how contractual arbitrage alters the first-period behavior of those
agents who are subject to the incomplete government intervention. Each point on S and D
represent respectively the marginal cost (MC) and willingness to pay (MV ) for a particular
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seller and buyer that is not subject to incomplete intervention.11 S ′ and D′ represent instead
the first period “strategic” supply and demand derived from these contractual arbitrage
activities. As the figure shows, the strategic demand rotates around the (non-strategic)
demand D at the second period equilibrium price in the market track which, according to
Lemma 1, is equal to P e. Similarly, the strategic supply rotates around the (non-strategic)
supply S at P e.
To understand how S ′ and D′ are derived, let us consider the buyers’ decision (the
problem faced by the producers is similar), starting with a buyer for whomMV > P e. From
Lemma 1, we know that the buyer will always consume in the second period. If he enters a
transaction in the first period, his total payoff for the two periods will be
(1 + δ)(MV − P ).
given that he is locked into the first period price P . If he does not enter a transaction in
the first period, he will be able to trade in the market track at the price P e in the second
period. Thus his total payoff will be
δ(MV − P e).
The buyer is indifferent about whether or not to carry out a transaction in the first period
when
(1 + δ)(MV − P ) = δ(MV − P e),
or P =
MV + δP e
1 + δ
.
Thus for example when δ = 1, a buyer with marginal willingness to pay equal to a will have
a “strategic willingness to pay” in the first period equal to b = a+c
2
, as illustrated in Figure
1.
Consider, on the other hand, a buyer for whom MV < P e. As we have discussed earlier,
11We do not incorporate in this picture the supply and demand of those agents under complete intervention,
as their transactions are dictated by the government and therefore they do not respond to the anticipated
dual track liberalization. However, as we will discuss in section 5, the presence of these agents does affect
the market equilibrium price in the second period when the dual track reform is implemented.
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such a buyer will never actually consume the product in the second period, but will instead
sell the commodity back to the market track.12 For such a buyer, transacting in the first
period leads to a (positive or negative) profit P e − P in the second, since he can use the
liberalized track to fulfill his obligation. Consequently, the total payoff for such a buyer to
transact in the first period is
MV − P + δ(P e − P ).
If, on the other hand, the buyer does not engage in a transaction in the first period, he will
be free from any obligation to trade in the second, and will not enter in a transaction at that
time since MV < P e. Consequently, a buyer with MV < P e is indifferent between buying
or not in the first period at the price P when
MV − P + δ(P e − P ) = 0
or P =
MV + δP e
1 + δ
.
In Figure 1, a buyer with the marginal willingness to pay g has a “strategic willingness to
pay” f = e+g
2
when δ = 1.
We have thus derived the “strategic” willingness to pay P , given a buyer’s true marginal
willingness to pay MV and the second period equilibrium price P e. Likewise, we can derive
the “strategic” willingness to produce P , given a buyer’s marginal cost to produce MC and
the second period equilibrium price P e. Rewriting MV = D−1(Q) and MC = S−1(Q), we
characterize the “strategic” demand D′−1(Q,P e) and the “strategic” supply S ′−1(Q,P e) in
the following
Lemma 2 Let P e be the second period equilibrium price in the liberalized track. Among
agents who are subject to incomplete government intervention only, the first period supply in
anticipation of the dual track liberalization is given by
S ′−1(Q,P e) =
S−1(Q) + δP e
1 + δ
12In the case of a labor market, this means that an employer, who is compelled to hire his old employees
with the value of marginal product of labor lower than the market wage rate, will second these workers.
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and the corresponding first period demand is given by
D′−1(Q,P e) =
D−1(Q) + δP e
1 + δ
.
5 The Dynamic Welfare Implications of Dual Track
Reform
We are now ready to evaluate whether, from a dynamic perspective, anticipated dual track
liberalization is efficiency enhancing and Pareto improving as compared to the status quo.
As it turns out, the answer to this question depends on whether the status quo government
policy involves or not complete intervention. To illustrate the point, we begin with the
case of a market economy, where there is only incomplete intervention, and consider next
the situation of a mixed economy, where some individuals are instead subject to complete
intervention.
5.1 Price intervention in a market economy
In a market economy no transaction is dictated by the government in the status quo. As a
result, in the second period the equilibrium price P e is determined by the intersection of the
agents’ marginal willingness to pay and of the agents’ marginal costs to produce, as shown
in Figure 2.
Suppose that in the first period the government fixes the price at P1 < P
e. In the first
period, if agents do not anticipate future policy changes, the quantity exchanged will be Q1,
so that S−1(Q1) = P1. When a dual track liberalization is instead expected, sellers have
an incentive to withhold their sales in the first period, in order to avoid being locked into
a contract fixing the low price P1. At the same time, buyers have an additional incentive
to transact in the first period so as to lock up the low price P1. This implies that the first
period excessive demand persists under the anticipated dual track liberalization. Let Qd1
be the equilibrium quantity transacted in the first period under the anticipated dual track
liberalization. Following Lemma 2, Qd1 is given by
P1 =
S−1(Qd1) + δP
e
1 + δ
,
10
Figure 2: Price setting without complete intervention
or
S−1(Qd1) = P1 + δ(P1 − P e)
< P1
< S−1(Q1).
In other words, contractual arbitrage exacerbates the shortage in the first period as Qd1 < Q1.
The exacerbated shortage means that, as compared to the status quo, some additional
buyers are rationed out and hence become worse off in the first period. Moreover, because
they are rationed out in the first period, they will have to purchase the commodity at the
price P e > P1 in the second. Thus these users must be worse-off as compared to the status
quo, even inter–temporally. Dual track liberalization can therefore not be Pareto improving
in the dynamic sense. An analogous argument can be made if the government sets instead
the first period price P1 > P
e. We summarize our discussion in the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the government status quo policy takes the form of an incom-
plete intervention involving price setting. Then the anticipated dual track liberalization is
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never Pareto improving.
To understand the intuition behind this proposition, it is useful to focus on the behavior
of the marginal agent (producer or buyer) who earns zero surplus in the status quo. When the
reform is implemented with the dual–track approach, the marginal agent continues to receive
zero surplus in the second period as long as he transacts in the first. Anticipating the dual
track reform, this agent will be better off by withdrawing from the first period transaction.
This is because, with the government setting the price in the status quo, the marginal agent’s
counterpart will earn a positive surplus almost surely (because of random rationing). By
withdrawing from the first period transaction, the marginal agent avoids being locked into
the first period price by the dual track mechanism. As a result, this positive surplus will be
redistributed between the two agents following the price control removal and the marginal
agent will receive a positive surplus. As the marginal agent withdraws from the transaction,
his counterpart, who earns a positive surplus under the status quo, will no longer be able to
enjoy a positive surplus in the first period. To make things worse, the inability to trade in
the first period also means that the marginal agent’s counterpart is no longer able to take
advantage of the dual–track mechanism in the second period, which is designed to preserve
the positive surplus he would have otherwise enjoyed under the status quo. Consequently,
he becomes worse off in both periods.
5.2 A mixed economy
In a mixed economy, there are both agents whose transactions are dictated by the govern-
ment, as well as agents whose transactions are subject to incomplete government interven-
tion. This has an important implication. With both types of intervention at play, demand
and supply from agents that are subject to the incomplete intervention in the first period
will no longer determine the equilibrium price in the second period. In fact, because in the
segment where the government imposes the complete intervention in the first period, agents
are arbitrarily ordered or not to transact, the second-period equilibrium price P e can be
anywhere relative to the demand and the supply of agents that are subject to the incomplete
intervention. Figure 3 illustrates the point. In the left panel the second-period equilibrium
price P e is above the point where D and S intersects. In the right panel, on the other hand,
it is below. Notice that, in either cases, when a dual–track reform is implemented both
12
Figure 3: The second-period equilibrium with complete intervention in the first period
the strategic demand and the strategic supply rotate in correspondence of the second-period
equilibrium price P e i.e. around the true marginal willingness to pay, D, and the actual
marginal cost to produce, S, respectively.
The presence of a group of agents subject to complete intervention in the first period
makes it possible for a dual track reform to alleviate the first-period distortion and imple-
ment a Pareto improving outcome. To see this, consider Figure 4. Here we illustrate the case
where, in addition to the complete intervention on a group of agents, the government directly
sets the price, P1, for the rest of the economy. In the status quo, the output equals Q1 in the
first period, whereas it equals Qd1 > Q1 in the first period when a dual–track reform that re-
moves both forms of government intervention is anticipated. By revealed preferences, agents
participating in the transactions involving quantities Qd1 −Q1 must be better off, regardless
how the additional amount is rationed among buyers who are willing to participate in these
transactions. Interestingly, given that rationing is random, it is possible that some buyers
may willingly withdraw from the first–period transaction in anticipation of the upcoming
dual–track reform. However, by revealed preferences, they are also better off. In fact, we
can establish the following
13
Figure 4: Price setting with complete intervention
Proposition 2 Suppose that the government status quo policy involves incomplete interven-
tion over a group of agents along with complete intervention over the rest. Then anticipated
dual track liberalization is Pareto improving if and only if
a) the incomplete intervention takes the form of price-setting; and
b) fixing the status quo price P1, the second–period equilibrium price P
e, satisfies one of the
following conditions:
P e ≥ P1 and S ′(P1, P e) ≥ D(P1); or (1)
P e ≤ P1 and D′(P1, P e) ≥ S(P1). (2)
The proof is straightforward and is again omitted. Condition (1) states that if the second–
period price P e rises above the first–period controlled price P1, the producers’ strategic
response must continue to allow the marginal buyer to carry out his transaction in the first
period. The workings of this condition is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 5. Given the
first–period price P1, the second–period equilibrium price P
e∗ must lie in the range indicated
by the arrow in order for the dual–track reform to be Pareto improving. Condition (2) states
14
Figure 5: Extent of complete intervention for a Pareto–improving dual–track reform
instead that the buyers’ strategic response must continue to allow the marginal producer to
carry out his transaction in the first period. The workings of this condition is shown in the
right panel of Figure 5, where the arrow illustrates, for a given P1, the range of P
e at which
the dual–track reform is Pareto improving.
To understand the logic of this proposition, notice that an anticipated dual–track reform
only preserves the amount of surplus agents actually obtain in the first period, and not the
surplus they would obtain in the status quo. Thus, for an anticipated dual–track reform
to be Pareto improving as compared to the status quo, it is necessary that the reform
avoids a redistribution of social surplus in the first period, which implies that the incomplete
government intervention must involve price fixing.
Furthermore, for the anticipated dual–track reform to be Pareto improving, the agents’
strategic response must alleviate the first–period distortion, so that no one will be forced
out of first–period transactions and hence lose access to the protection brought about by
the dual–track mechanism. This implies that the reform must give the marginal agent, who
receives zero surplus in the status quo, an additional incentive to trade in the first period and
must at the same time guarantee that his counterpart will continue to participate in the first
period transaction. For the marginal agent, this additional incentive is represented by the
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possibility of locking in the first period price and carry out transactions at that price after
the reform has occurred. For this incentive to be present, it must be the case that P e > P1 if
the marginal agent is a buyer, while P e < P1 if the marginal agent is a seller. In other words,
the second period equilibrium price must move in the “wrong” direction, given the nature
of the government policy on the agents subject to incomplete intervention. For this to be
the case, the transactions dictated by the government must have forced a distortion that is
in the same direction as the distortion brought about by the government policy. That is, if
the price control leads to excessive supply among agents subject to incomplete intervention
(and hence the marginal agent is a buyer, as in the left panel of Figure 5), the complete
intervention must have either forced supply or constrained demand among the rest of the
agents13 and vice versa.
In addition, as shown in Figure 5, the distortion created by the complete intervention
must be severe enough. In the left panel of Figure 5, this means that the removed excessive
supply is sufficiently large so that P e ≥ P1; whereas in the right panel, this means that the
removed excessive demand is sufficiently large so that P e ≤ P1.
Furthermore, in order for the marginal agent to continue to trade in the first period,
his counterpart must be willing to do so as well. When this happens, the counterpart
will be locked into the price P1 in the second period, instead of being able to transact at
P e. Therefore, for the marginal agent counterpart to remain in the transaction in the first
period, this second period opportunity loss must be outweighted by the amount of surplus
the counterpart receives through the first period transaction.14
To summarize, for the anticipated dual–track reform to be Pareto improving, it is neces-
sary that (1) the incomplete intervention involves price setting, (2) the complete intervention
forces a distortion that is in the same direction as the distortion created by the incomplete
intervention and (3) the first distortion while limited in scale must be sufficiently large rela-
tively to the second one. It is easy to see that these conditions are also sufficient. As long as
the marginal agent and his counterpart continue to carry out the first–period transaction at
13As a result, when the complete intervention is lifted, either the forced supply will disappear or the
prohibited demand will surface, causing P e to rise above the intersection of D and S, as shown in the left
panel of Figure 5.
14This implies that the distortion created be the complete intervention must be limited. In the case of
Figure 5, P e must not be higher than P e∗ in the left panel, and P e must not be lower than P e∗ in the right
panel.
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Figure 6: Application: Domestic price control together with exclusion of foreign producers
the same price as under the status quo, no one can be worse-off in the first period compared
to the status quo. From Lemma 1, all agents must be at least as well as off in the second
period as in the first period. Hence the reform must be Pareto improving as compared to
the status quo.15
As an application of the preceding analysis, consider a small open economy for which the
status quo policy involves price setting in the domestic market and a quota that limits foreign
competition. In particular, only a limited number of foreign buyers or producers are allowed
to trade in the domestic market at the fixed price. Figure 6 illustrates this situation, where
S and D indicate the first–period supply and demand in the domestic market (including
those foreign suppliers that are allowed to enter under the quota) respectively.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the status quo policy is domestic price fixing, combined with an
import or export quota. Let P1 be the domestic price fixed by the government. Then, domestic
cum trade liberalization is Pareto improving if and only if either condition (1) or condition
(2) of proposition 2 holds.
15In fact, we can apply this result to the case of a quota and show that a dual track reform will never be
Pareto improving. This is because we can think of a quota as the government imposing complete intervention
on a group of agents, and impose no price controls on the other.
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A number of policy implications can be drawn from Corollary 1. First, as long as the
first–period price, P1, and the world price P
e satisfy conditions (1) or (2), the anticipated
dual–track reform is Pareto-improving regardless of the size of the quota. Second, if the
government imposes an import (or export) quota under the status quo, an anticipated dual–
track reform can be Pareto improving only if the government status quo policy also fixes the
domestic price so that it creates excessive demand (or supply, respectively). Third, in order
for the dual–track reform to be Pareto improving, it is necessary that the domestic price is
higher than the world price when the status quo policy involves an import quota, and vice
versa when the status quo policy involves an export quota instead.
6 Conclusions
The remarkable success of China’s transition from a centrally planned to a market economy
raises the question of the extent to which the lessons from the Chinese experience can be
applied elsewhere. In this paper, we have addressed this issue by examining the broader
implementability of the dual–track approach to market liberalization. We begin our analysis
with a careful definition of “elsewhere”, that is economies where policy interventions do not
completely dictate prices and quantities and market signals continue to play a role. In this
setting we have argued that a dynamic perspective should be taken to evaluate the welfare
implications of a dual–track liberalization.
Extending the static analysis carried out by Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) to a simple
two–period model, we have been able to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for a
dual–track liberalization to be Pareto–improving from a dynamic perspective, and we have
shown how this condition could be satisfied for instance in a small open economy. Thus, our
analysis offers some important lessons to policy makers interested in reforms without losers.
When this condition is not met, a dual–track approach can be effective only if the policy
change is implemented as a surprise.16 Otherwise, a policy maker may need to credibly
commit himself to not implement the reform in the dual track fashion.
16The dual track approach could also be effective if the contract to be enforced is one signed in the distant
past, so that agents are not able to strategically react to the announced policy change. Of course, enforcing
old contracts presents additional difficulties – i.e. transactions records may not be readily available – and
at the same time transactions carried out in the distant past may not reflect agents’ current preferences or
cost conditions.
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Finally, the analysis we have carried out furthers our understanding of the Chinese ex-
perience. In fact, it allows us to identify one of the key factors in the success of the Chinese
reforms. That is, China began as a centrally planned economy, where the planning authority
completely dictated all trades both in terms of prices and quantities, thus eliminating the
possibility for agents to react to the forthcoming reform.
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Appendix
To highlight the role of contractual arbitrage, our analysis so far has focused on perishable
goods. In this appendix, we extend it to consider the case of non-perishable goods. With
non-perishable goods comes the possibility to arbitrage by storing. In what follows, we inves-
tigate the difference between contractual arbitrage and what we will call physical arbitrage,
i.e. arbitrage by storage, and whether the possibility to carry out physical arbitrage might
eliminate the contractual arbitrage brought about by the dual track reform.
For simplicity we will set our analysis in the context of a market economy, where no
transaction is dictated by the government. As before, we assume that each buyer and
each producer can consume and produce respectively one unit of the good in each period.
Anticipating a price change, both agents can store the good, but a fraction 1− k ∈ [0, 1) of
it deteriorates over the period and becomes unusable.
Let P e and P1 respectively be the second–period and the first–period price. A producer
will decide to store his output in the first period to sell it in the second if and only if
δkP e − P1 > 0.
A buyer can carry out physical arbitrage by acquiring an additional unit of the good in the
first period for two purposes. He can either buy to stock up for resale in the second period,
in which case he will engage in arbitrage if and only if
δkP e − P1 > 0
or he will buy an additional unit of good in the first period in order to consume it in the
second period. In this case, he will engage in arbitrage if and only if
δkMV − P1 > δ(MV − P e).
In equilibrium physical arbitrage implies that
δkP e ≤ P1
In other words, the first–period price may dictate the level of the second–period equilibrium
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price. Furthermore, we have that
δkMV − P1 ≤ δk(MV − P e) ≤ δ(MV − P e)
In other words, in equilibrium a buyer never arbitrages to consume the good in the second–
period.
We can notice immediately a number of differences between contractual and physical
arbitrage. Unlike the contractual arbitrage condition outlined in section 4, the arbitrage
incentive induced by the possibility of storing the good is independent of the producer’s
characteristics. Furthermore, differently from contractual arbitrage, physical arbitrage can
take place only if P e > P1, whereas the former can take place when either P
e > P1 or
when P e < P1. More importantly, physical arbitrage means that the second–period resource
allocation will be distorted,17 whereas the second period resource allocation is efficient under
a dual track reform, despite contractual arbitrage.
Next, let us consider the effects of a dual track reform in the presence of a non–perishable
good. Some observations can be drawn immediately. Physical arbitrage does not change our
previous analysis of contractual arbitrage when the status quo policy involves only price-
setting that leads to excessive demand in the first period. Second, physical arbitrage is
irrelevant to our previous analysis also if, without it, the second–period market clearing
price satisfies the condition P e ≤ P1
δk
.18 Third, physical arbitrage eliminates the contractual
arbitrage we described earlier if and only if (1) the status quo policy involves price setting that
creates excessive supply in the first period, (2) without arbitrage through storage, P e > P1
δk
,
and (3) δk = 1.
Figure 7 illustrates why the three conditions above are sufficient for physical arbitrage
to eliminate contractual arbitrage. In this example, the original government intervention
involves price fixing in the first period that generates excess demand. If the economy is
liberalized, the second period market price is expected to rise. However, if δk = 1, physical
arbitrage implies that P e = P1 in equilibrium. When this happens, there is no incentive for
any party to strategically respond to the forthcoming dual–track reform. If instead δk < 1,
P e > P1 even after physical arbitrage and thus there will still be incentives to respond to
17This is because the actual supply is no longer equal to the true marginal cost.
18In this case there would be no incentive to store the good in the first period.
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Figure 7: Contractual arbitrage and arbitrage through storage
an anticipated dual track–liberalization. As a result, arbitrage by storage will not eliminate
the possibility of contractual arbitrage.
Thus, we have shown that while the contractual arbitrage brought about by a dual–track
liberalization and physical arbitrage by storage are related, they are fundamentally different
both in terms of their working as well as in terms of their welfare implications.
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